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Abstract
How can one detect friendly and adversarial behavior from raw data? Detecting
whether an environment is a friend, a foe, or anything in between, remains a poorly
understood yet desirable ability for safe and robust agents. This paper proposes
a definition of these environmental “attitudes” based on an characterization of
the environment’s ability to react to the agent’s private strategy. We define an
objective function for a one-shot game that allows deriving the environment’s
probability distribution under friendly and adversarial assumptions alongside the
agent’s optimal strategy. Furthermore, we present an algorithm to compute these
equilibrium strategies, and show experimentally that both friendly and adversarial
environments possess non-trivial optimal strategies.
Keywords: AI safety; friendly and adversarial; game theory; bounded rationality.
1 Introduction
How can agents detect friendly and adversarial behavior from raw data? Discovering whether an
environment (or a part within) is a friend or a foe is a poorly understood yet desirable skill for safe
and robust agents. Possessing this skill is important for a number of situations, including:
• Multi-agent systems: Some environments, especially in multi-agent systems, might have
incentives to either help or hinder the agent [1]. For example, an agent playing football must
anticipate both the creative moves of its team members and its opponents. Thus, learning to
discern between friends and foes might not only help the agent to avoid danger, but also open
the possibility to solving taks throught collaboration that it could not solve alone otherwise.
• Model uncertainty: An agent can choose to impute “adversarial” or “friendly” qualities to an
environment that it does not know well. For instance, an agent that is trained in a simulator
could compensate for the innaccuracies by assuming that the real environment differs from
the simulated one—but in an adversarial way, so as to devise countermeasures ahead of
time [2]. Similarly, innacuracies might also originate in the agent itself—for instance, due
to bounded rationality [3, 4].
Typically, these situations involve a knowledge limitation that the agent addresses by responding with
a risk-sensitive policy.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, we offer a broad definition of friendly and
adversarial behavior. Furthermore, by varying a single real-valued parameter, one can select
from a continuous range of behaviors that smoothly interpolate between fully adversarial and fully
friendly. Second, we derive the agent’s (and environment’s) optimal strategy under friendly or
adversarial assumptions. To do so, we treat the agent-environment interaction as a one-shot game
with information-constraints, and characterize the optimal strategies at equilibrium. Finally, we
provide an algorithm to find the equilibrium strategies of the agent and the environment. We
also demonstrate empirically that the resulting strategies display non-trivial behavior which vary
qualitatively with the information-constraints.
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2 Motivation & Intuition
We begin with an intuitive example using multi-armed bandits. This helps motivating our mathemati-
cal formalization in the next section.
Game theory is the classical economic paradigm to analyze the interaction between agents [5].
However, within game theory, the term adversary is justified by the fact that in zero-sum games the
equilibrium strategies are maximin strategies, that is, strategies that maximize the expected payoff
under the assumption that the adversary will minimize the payoffs. However, when the game is not
a zero-sum game, interpreting an agent’s behavior as adversarial is far less obvious, as there are
is no coupling between payoffs, and the strong guarantees provided by the minimax theorem are
unavailable [6]. The notions of “indifferent” and “friendly” are similarly troublesome to capture
using the standard game-theoretic language.
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Figure 1: Average rewards for four different two-armed bandits (columns A–D) under two different
strategies: (I) a uniform strategy (arms were chosen using 1000 fair coin flips) and (II) a deterministic
strategy (500 times arm 1, then 500 times arm 2). Bandits get to choose in each turn (using a
probabilistic rule) which one of the two arms will deliver the reward. The precise probabilistic rule
used here will be explained later in Section 5 (Experiments).
Intuitively though, terms such as adversarial, indifferent, and friendly have simple meanings. To
illustrate, consider two different strategies (I & II) used on four different two-armed bandits (named
A–D), where each strategy gets to play 1000 rounds. In each round, a bandit secretly chooses which
one (and only one) of the two arms will deliver the reward. Importantly, each bandit chooses the
location of the arm using a different probabilistic rule. Then the agent pulls an arm, receiving the
reward if it guesses correctly and nothing otherwise.
The two different strategies are:
I The agent plays all 1000 rounds using a uniformly random strategy.
II The agent deterministically pulls each arm exactly 500 times using some fixed rule.
Note that each strategy pulls each arm approximately 50% of the time. Now, the agent’s average
rewards for all four bandits are shown in Figure 1. Based on these results, we make the following
observations:
1. Sensitivity to strategy. The two sets of average rewards for bandit A are statistically indistinguish-
able, that is, they stay the same regardless of the agent’s strategy. This corresponds to the
stochastic bandit type in the literature [7, 8]. In contrast, bandits B–D yielded different
average rewards for the two strategies. Although each arm was pulled approximately 500
times, it appears as if the reward distributions were a function of the strategy.
2. Adversarial/friendly exploitation of strategy. The average rewards do not always add up to one, as
one would expect if the rewards were truly independent of the strategy. Compared to the
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uniform strategy, the deterministic strategy led to either an increase (bandit B) or a decrease
of the empirical rewards (bandits C and D). We can interpret the behavior of bandits C & D
as an adversarial exploitation of the predictability of the agent’s strategy—much like an
exploitation of a deterministic strategy in a rock-paper-scissors game. Analogously, bandit B
appears to be friendly towards the agent, tending to place the rewards favorably.
3. Strength of exploitation. Notice how the rewards of both adversarial bandits (C & D) when using
strategy II differ in how strongly they deviate from the baseline set by strategy I. This
difference suggests that bandit D is better at reacting to the agent’s strategy than bandit C—
and therefore also more adversarial. A bandit that can freely choose any placement of
rewards is known as a non-stochastic bandit [9, 8].
4. Cooperating/hedging. The nature of the bandit qualitatively affects the agent’s optimal strategy. A
friendly bandit (B) invites the agent to cooperate through the use of predictable policies;
whereas adversarial bandits (C & D) pressure the agent to hedge through randomization.
Simply put, bandits B–D appear to react to the agent’s private strategy in order to manipulate the
payoffs. Abstractly, we can picture this as follows. First, a reactive environment can be thought of
as possessing privileged information about the agent’s private strategy, acquired e.g. through past
experience or through “spying”. Then, the amount of information determines the extent to which
the environment is willing to deviate from a baseline, indifferent strategy. Second, the adversarial or
friendly nature of the environment is reflected by the strategy it chooses: an adversarial (resp. friendly)
environment will select the reaction that minimizes (resp. maximizes) the agent’s payoff. The diagram
in Figure 2 illustrates this idea in a Rock-Paper-Scissors game.
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Figure 2: Reacting to the agent’s strategy in Rock-Paper-Scissors. The diagram depicts the simplex
of the environment’s mixed strategies over the three pure strategies Rock, Paper, and Scissors, located
at the corners. a) When the agent picks a strategy it fixes its expected payoff (shown in color, where
darker is worse and lighter is better). b) An indifferent environment corresponds to a player using a
fixed strategy (mixed or pure). c) However, a reactive environment can deviate from the indifferent
strategy (the set of choices is shown as a ball). A friendly environment would choose in a way that
benefits the player (i.e. try playing Paper as much as possible if the player mostly plays Scissors);
analogously, an adversarial environment would attempt to play the worst strategy for the agent.
We make one final observation.
5. Agent/environment symmetry. Let us turn the tables on the agent: how should we play if we were
the bandit? A moment of reflection reveals that the analysis is symmetrical. An agent that
does not attempt to maximize the payoff, or cannot do so due to limited reasoning power,
will pick its strategy in a way that is indifferent to our placement of the reward. In contrast,
a more effective agent will react to our choice, seemingly anticipating it. Furthermore, the
agent will appear friendly if our goal is to maximize the payoff and adversarial if our goal is
to minimize it.
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This symmetry implies that the choices of the agent and the environment are coupled to each other,
suggesting a solution principle for determining a strategy profile akin to a Nash equilibrium [5]. The
next section will provide a concrete formalization.
3 Characterizing Friends and Foes
In this section we formalize the picture sketched out in the preceeding section. We first state an
objective function for a game that couples the agent’s interests with those of the environment and
limits both player’s ability to react to each other. We then derive expressions for their optimal
strategies (i.e. the best-response functions). Based on these, we then give an existence plus an
indifference result for the ensuing equilibrium strategies.
3.1 Objective function
Let X and Z denote the set of actions (i.e. pure strategies) of the agent and the environment
respectively; and let Q and P denote prior and posterior strategies respectively. We represent the
interaction between the agent and the environment as a one-shot game in which both the agent,
starting from prior strategies Q(X) ∈ ∆(X ) and Q(Z) ∈ ∆(Z), choose (mixed) posterior strategies
P (X) ∈ ∆(X ) and P (Z) ∈ ∆(Z) respectively. The goal of the agent is to maximize the payoffs
given by a function that maps choices (x, z) ∈ X × Z into utilities U(x, z) ∈ R.
We model the two players’ sensitivity to each other’s strategy as coupled deviations from indifferent
prior strategies, whereby each player attempts to extremize the expected utility, possibly pulling in
opposite directions. Formally, consider the objective function
J = E[U(X,Z)] − 1αDKL(P (X)‖Q(X)) − 1βDKL(P (Z)‖Q(Z))
=
∑
x,z P (x)P (z)U(x, z) − 1α
∑
x P (x) log
P (x)
Q(x) − 1β
∑
z P (z) log
P (z)
Q(z)
= {coupled expected payoffs} − {agent deviation cost} − {env. deviation cost}
(1)
where α, β ∈ R, known as the inverse temperature parameters, determine the reaction abilities of the
agent and the environment respectively.
This objective function (1) is obtained by coupling two free energy functionals (one for each player)
which model decision-making with information-constraints (see e.g. [10, 4]). We will discuss the
interpretation of this choice further in Section 6.1. Other constraints are possible, e.g. any deviation
quantified as a Bregman divergence [11].
3.2 Friendly and Adversarial Environments
Both the sign and the magnitude of the inverse temperatures control the player’s reactions as follows.
1. The sign of β determines the extremum operation: if β is positive, then J is concave for fixed
P (X) and the environment maximizes the objective w.r.t. P (Z); analogously, a negative
value of β yields a convex objective J that is minimized w.r.t P (Z).
2. The magnitude of β determines the strength of the deviation: when |β| ≈ 0, the environment can
only pick strategies P (Z) that are within a small neighborhood of the center Q(Z), whereas
|β|  0 yields a richer set of choices for P (Z).
The parameter α plays an analogous role, although in this exposition we will focus on α ≥ 0 and
interpret it as a parameter that controls the agent’s ability to react. In particular, setting α = 0 fixes
P (X) to Q(X), which is useful for deriving the posterior environment P (Z) for a given, fixed agent
strategy.
From the above, it is easy to see that friendly and adversarial environments are modeled through the
appropriate choice of β. For α > 0 and β > 0, we obtain a friendly environment that helps the agent
in maximizing the objective, i.e.
max
P (X)
max
P (Z)
{J [P (X), P (Z)]}.
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In contrast, for α > 0 and β < 0, we get an adversarial environment that minimizes the objective:
max
P (X)
min
P (Z)
{J [P (X), P (Z)]} = min
P (Z)
max
P (X)
{J [P (X), P (Z)]}.
In particular, the equality after exchanging the order of the minimization and maximization can be
shown to hold using the minimax theorem: J is a continuous and convex-concave function of P (X)
and P (Z), which in turn live in compact and convex sets ∆(X ) and ∆(Z) respectively. The resulting
strategies then locate a saddle point of J .
3.3 Existence and Characterization of Equilibria
To find the equilibrium strategies for (1), we calculate the best-response function for each player,
i.e. the optimal strategy for a given strategy of the other player in both the friendly and adversarial
cases. Proofs to the claims can be found in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. The best-response functions fX , fZ for the agent and the environment respectively
are given by the Gibbs distributions
P (X) = fX [P (Z)] : P (x) =
1
NX
Q(x) exp{αU(x)}, U(x) :=
∑
z
P (z)U(x, z); (2)
P (Z) = fZ [P (X)] : P (z) =
1
NZ
Q(z) exp{βU(z)}, U(z) :=
∑
x
P (x)U(x, z) (3)
respectively, where NX and NZ are normalizing constants. 
Given the above best-response functions fX and fZ , we define an equilibrium strategy profile of the
objective function (1) as a fixed-point of the combined best-response function defined as a mapping
f : ∆(X )×∆(Z)→ ∆(X )×∆(Z) that concatenates the two best-response functions, i.e.
f [P (X), P (Z)] := (fX [P (Z)], fZ [P (X)]). (4)
That is, the equilibrium strategy profile1, in analogy with the Nash equilibrium, is a mixed-strategy
profile that lies at the intersection of both best-response curves. With this definition, the following
existence result follows immediately.
Proposition 2. There always exists an equilibrium strategy profile. 
Finally, the following result characterizes the equilibrium strategy profile in terms of an indifference
principle (later illustrated in Figure 3). In particular, the result shows that both players strive towards
playing strategies that equalize each other’s net payoffs defined as
JX(x) := α
∑
z
P (z)U(x, z)− log P (x)
Q(x)
and JZ(z) := β
∑
x
P (x)U(x, z)− log P (z)
Q(z)
. (5)
Proposition 3. In equilibrium, the net payoffs are such that for all x, x′ ∈ X and all z, z′ ∈ Z in
the support of P (X) and P (Z) respectively,
JX(x) = JX(x
′) and JZ(z) = JZ(z′).
4 Computing Equilibria
Now we derive an algorithm for computing the equilibrium strategies for the agent and the environ-
ment. It is well-known that using standard gradient descent with competing losses is difficult [13, 14],
and indeed a straight-forward gradient-ascent/descent method on the objective (1) turns out to be
numerically brittle, especially for values of α and β near zero. Rather, we let the strategies follow a
smoothed dynamics on the exponential manifold until reaching convergence. Equation (2) shows that
the log-probabilities of the best-response strategies are:
logP (x)
+
= logQ(x) + α
∑
z
P (z)U(x, z)
logP (z)
+
= logQ(z) + β
∑
x
P (x)U(x, z)
1This definition is closely related to the Quantal-Response-Equilibrium [12].
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where += denotes equality up to a constant. This suggests the following iterative algorithm. Starting
from L0(x) = logQ(x) and L0(z) = logQ(z), one can iterate the following four equations for time
steps t = 0, 1, 2, . . .
Lt+1(x) = (1− ηt) · Lt(x) + ηt ·
(
logQ(x) + α
∑
z
Pt(z)U(x, z)
)
(6)
Pt+1(x) =
expLt+1(x)∑
x˜ expLt+1(x˜)
(7)
Lt+1(z) = (1− ηt) · Lt(z) + ηt ·
(
logQ(z) + β
∑
x
Pt+1(x)U(x, z)
)
(8)
Pt+1(z) =
expLt+1(z)∑
z˜ expLt+1(z˜)
(9)
Here, the learning rate ηt > 0 can be chosen constant but sufficiently small to achieve a good
approximation; alternatively, one can use an annealing schedule that conform to the Robbins-Monro
conditions
∑
t ηt →∞ and
∑
t η
2
t <∞. Figure (3) shows four example simulations of the learning
dynamics.
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Figure 3: Learning dynamics for computing equilibria. The plots show four learning dynamics for a
utility matrix U = I2×2 and prior strategies Q(X) = (0.9, 0.1) and Q(Z) = (0.1, 0.9). To generate
the dynamics, the following inverse temperatures and learning rates were chosen: a) α = β = 10 and
η = 0.01; b) α = 10, β = −10 and η = 0.01; c) α = 20, β = −20 and η = 0.01; and d) α = 20,
β = −20 and a larger learning rate η = 0.1. Top row: Evolution of the strategies. The prior strategies
are located in the top-left corner. The objective function is color-coded and ranges from 0 (dark blue)
to 1.2 (yellow). Bottom row: Evolution of the per-action net payoffs JX and JZ defined in equation
(5) illustrating the indifference principle. The black and red curves correspond to the agent’s and the
environment’s actions respectively.
5 Experiments
5.1 Bernoulli Bandit
We now return to the two-armed bandits discussed in the introduction (Figure 1) and explain how
these were modeled.
Assuming that the agent plays the rows (i.e. arms) and the bandit/environment the columns (i.e. reward
placement), the utility matrix was chosen as
U = I2×2 =
[
1 0
0 1
]
.
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This reflects the fact that there is always one and only one reward.
We did not want the agent to play an equilibrium strategy, but rather investigate each bandit’s reaction
to a uniform strategy and two pure strategies: that is, Q(X) = [0.5, 0.5]T , Q(X) = [1, 0]T , and
Q(X) = [0, 1]T respectively. Then, choosing α = 0 implies that the agent’s posterior strategy stays
fixed, i.e. P (X) = Q(X).
For the bandits, we fixed a common prior strategy Q(Z) = [0.4, 0.6]T , that is, slightly biased toward
the second arm. Obviously, appropriate inverse temperatures were chosen to model the indifferent,
friendly, adversarial, and very adversarial bandit:
Bandit Type β
A Indifferent/Stochastic 0
B Friendly 1
C Adversarial −1
D Very Adversarial −2
We then computed the equilibrium strategies for each combination, which in this case (due to α = 0)
reduces to computing the bandits’ best-response functions for each one of the three agent strategies.
Once the posterior distributions P (Z) were calculated, we simulated each one and collected the
empirical rewards which are summarized in Figure 1.
5.2 Gaussian Bandit, and Dependence on Variance
In a stochastic bandit, the optimal strategy is to deterministically pick the arm with the largest
expected payoff. However, in adversarial and friendly bandits, the optimal strategy can depend on the
higher-order moments of the reward distribution, as was shown previously in [15]. The aim of this
experiment is to reproduce these results, showing the dependence of the optimal strategy on both the
mean and variance of the payoff distribution.
Setup. To do so, we considered a four-armed bandit with payoffs that are distributed according to
(truncated and discretized) Gaussian distributions. To investigate the interplay between mean and the
variance, we chose four Gaussians with:
• increasing means, where the means µ are uniformly spaced between -0.2 and 0.2;
• and decreasing variances, where the standard deviations σ are uniformly spaced between 1
and 2.
Thus, the arm with the largest mean is the most precise. Clearly, if the bandit is stochastic, arms are
ranked according to their mean payoffs irrespective of their variances.
We then performed a sweep through the bandit’s inverse temperature β, starting from an adversarial
(β = −3) and ending in a friendly bandit (β = +3), computing the equilibrium strategies for both
players along the way. Throughout the sweep, the agent’s inverse temperature was kept constant at
α = 30, modeling a highly rational agent.
Results. The results are shown in Figure 4. As expected, for values close to β ≈ 0 the agent’s
optimal strategy consists in (mostly) pulling the arm with the largest expected reward. In contrast,
adversarial bandits (β < 0) attempt to diminish the payoffs of the agent’s preferred arms, thus forcing
it to adopt a mixed strategy. In the friendly case (β > 0), the agent’s strategy becomes deterministic.
Interestingly though, the optimal arm switches to those with higher variance as β increases (e.g. see
Figure 4c). This is because Gaussians with larger variance are “cheaper to shift”; in other words, the
rate of growth of the KL-divergence per unit of translation is lower. Thus, arms that were suboptimal
for β = 0 can become optimal for larger β values if their variances are large. We believe that
these “phase transitions” are related to the ones previously observed under information-constraints
[16, 17, 18].
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Figure 4: Optimal strategy as a function of β. a) Stack plot showing the action probabilities of
the agent’s optimal action (α = 30) as a function of the inverse temperature parameter of the
bandit. Panels b & c show the payoff distributions of the four arms for an adversarial (β = −2) and
friendly bandit (β = 2). The dotted lines represent the prior distributions, and the colored lines the
environment’s posterior distributions, color-coded to match the actions in (a).
5.3 Linear Classifier
The purpose of our last experiment is to illustrate the non-trivial interactions that may arise between a
classifier and a reactive data source, be it friendly or adversarial. Specifically, we designed a simple
2-D linear classification example in which the agent chooses the parameters of the classifier and the
environment picks the binary data labels.
Method. We considered hard classifiers of the form y = σ(wTx− b) where x and y are the input
and the class label, w and b are the weight and the bias vectors, and σ is a hard sigmoid defined
by σ(u) = 1 if u ≥ 0 and σ(u) = −1 otherwise. To simplify our analysis, we chose a set of 25
data points (i.e. the inputs) placed on a 5 × 5 grid spread uniformly in [−1, 1]2. Furthermore, we
discretized the parameter space so that w and b have both 25 settings that are uniform in [−1; 1]2
(that is, just as the input locations), yielding a total of 252 = 625 possible parameter combinations
[w,b] ∈ Θ.
The agent’s task consisted in choosing a strategy to set those parameters. However, unlike a typical
classification task, here the agent could choose a distribution P (X = [w,b]) over Θ if deemed
necessary. Similarly, the environment picked the data labels indirectly by choosing the parameters of
an optimal classifier. Specifically, the environment could pick a distribution P (Z = [w,b]) over Θ,
which in turn induced (stochastic) labels on the data set.
The utility and the prior distributions were chosen as follows. The utility function U : Θ×Θ→ N
mapped each classifier-label pair (x, z) into the number of correctly classified data points. The prior
distribution of the agent Q(X) was uniform over Θ, reflecting initial ignorance. For the environment
we chose a prior with a strong bias toward label assignments that are compatible with z∗ ∈ Θ, where
z∗ = (w∗,b∗), w∗ = [−1,−0.5]T , and b∗ = [−0.5, 0.5]T . Specifically, for each label assignment
z ∈ Θ, its prior probability Q(z) was proportional to U(z, z∗), the number of data points that a
model based on z would correctly classify when the true labels are given by z∗ instead. Figure 5
shows the stochastic labels obtained by marginalizing over the prior strategies of the agent and the
environment respectively. Notice that although each individual classifier is linear, their mixture is not.
EnvironmentAgent
Error = 12.21
Figure 5: Prior distributions over labels. The diagram shows the (stochastic) labels obtained by
marginalizing over the linear classifiers chosen by the agent (left) and the environment (right).
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Results. Starting from the above prior, we then calculated various friendly and adversarial devi-
ations. First we improved the agent’s best-response strategy by setting the inverse temperature to
α = 30 and keeping the environment’s strategy fixed (β = 0). As a result, we obtained a crisper
(i.e. less stochastic) classifier that reduced the mistakes for the data points that are more distant from
the decision boundary. We will use these posterior strategies as the prior for our subsequent tests.
EnvironmentAgent
β = 0
α = 30
Error = 10.35
EnvironmentAgent
Error = 12.21
Next we generated two adversarial modifications of the environment (β = −0.1 and β = −1) while
keeping the agent’s strategy fixed, simulating an attack on a pre-trained classifier. The case β = −0.1
shows that a slightly adversarial environment attempts to increase the classification error by “shifting”
the members of the second class (white) towards the agent’s decision boundary. However, a very
adversarial environment (case β = −1) will simply flip the labels, nearly maximizing the expected
classification error.
EnvironmentAgent
EnvironmentAgent
EnvironmentAgent
Error = 10.35
Error = 13.00
Error = 22.25
β = -0.1
α = 0
β = -1
α = 0
If instead we pair a reactive agent (α = 10) with the previous adversarial environment (β = −1),
we see that the agent significantly improves his performance by slightly randomizing his classifier,
thereby thwarting the environment’s attempt to fully flip the labels. Finally, we paired a reactive agent
(α = 10) with a friendly environment (β = 1). As a result, both players cooperated by significantly
aligning and sharpening their choices, with the agent picking a crisp decision boundary that nearly
matched all the labels chosen by the environment.
EnvironmentAgent
Error = 1.51
EnvironmentAgent
Error = 15.80
EnvironmentAgent
Error = 10.35
β = -1
α = 10
β = 1
α = 10
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6 Discussion and Conclusions
6.1 Information Channel
The objective function (1) can be tied more closely to the idea of an information channel that allows
the agent and the environment to anticipate each other’s strategy (Section 2).
Let D be a random variable that encapsulates the totality of the information that informs the decisions
of the agent and the environment. Identify the posteriors P (X) and P (Z) with the mixed strategies
that the two players adopt after learning about D, that is, P (X) = Q(X|D) and P (Z) = Q(Z|D)
respectively. This corresponds to the graphical model:
D
ZX
Assuming D ∼ Q(D) and taking the expectation over D of the objective function (1), we obtain
ED[J ] = ED,X,Z
[
U(X,Z)
]− 1
α
I(X;D)− 1
β
I(Z;D), (10)
where I(X;D) and I(Z;D) are mutual information terms. These terms quantify the capacity of the
information channel between the background information D and the strategies.
With this connection, we can draw two conclusions. First, The baseline strategies Q(X) and Q(Z)
are the strategies that result when the two players do not observe the background information, since
Q(x) =
∑
d
Q(d)Q(x|d) and Q(z) =
∑
d
Q(d)Q(z|d),
that is, the players play one of their strategies according to their base rates, effectively averaging over
them. Second, the objective function (1) controls, via the inverse temperature parameters, the amount
of information about D that the agent and environment use to choose their strategy.
6.2 Relation to previous work
This work builds on a number of previous ideas. The characterization of friendly and adversarial
from Section 2 is a direct adaptation of the Gaussian case introduced in [15] to the case of discrete
strategy sets. Therein, the authors presented a model of multi-armed bandits for the special case of
Gaussian-distributed rewards in which the bandit can react to the strategy of the agent in a friendly
or adversarial way. They furthermore used this model to derive the agent’s optimal policy and
a Thompson sampling algorithm to infer the environment’s inverse temperature parameter from
experience. Our work can be thought as a adaptation of their model to normal-form games.
In turn, the formalization of friendly and adversarial behavior through information-constraints
was suggested in [19] (in the context of risk-sensitivity) and in [20, 4] (in sequential decision-
making). Information-constraints have also been used in game theory: in particular, Quantal Response
Equilibria feature reactive strategies that are bounded rational [12, 21], which relates to our case
when the inverse temperatures are positive.
Our work was also inspired by existing work in the bandit literature; in particular, by bandit algorithms
that achieve near-optimal performance in both stochastic and adversarial bandits [22, 23, 24]. Notice
however, that these algorithms do neither include the friendly/cooperative case nor distinguish
between different degrees of attitudes.
In multiagent learning there is work that considers how to act in different scenarios with varying,
discrete degrees of adversarial behaviour (see for instance [25, 26, 27, 28]). In particular, a Bayesian
approach has been tested to learn against a given class of opponents in stochastic games [29].
6.3 Learning the attitude of an environment
In this work we have centered our attention on formalizing friendly and adversarial behavior by
characterizing the statistics of such an environment in a one-shot game given three components:
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a) the strategy of the agent;
b) the prior strategy of the environment;
c) and an inverse temperature parameter.
This model can be used within a learning algorithm to detect the environment’s friendly or adversarial
attitude from past interactions akin to [25]. However, since this sacrifices the one-shot setup,
additional assumptions (e.g. of stationarity) need to be made to accommodate our definition.
For instance, in a Bayesian setup, the model can be used as a likelihood function P (z|β, θ, pi) of the
inverse temperature β and the parameters θ of the environment’s prior distribution P (z|θ) given the
parameters pi of the (private) strategy P (x|pi) used by the agent. If combined with a suitable prior
over β and θ, one can e.g. use Thompson sampling [30, 31] to implement an adaptive strategy that in
round t+ 1 plays the best response P (x|pit+1) for simulated parameters β′t+1 and θ′t+1 drawn from
the posterior P (β, θ|pi1:t, z1:t). This is the method adopted in [15].
Alternatively, another way of detecting whether the environment is reactive is by estimating the
mutual information I(pi; z|x) between the agent’s strategy parameter pi and the environment’s action z
given the player’s action. This is because, for a non-reactive environment, the agent’s action x forms a
Markov blanket for the environment’s response z and hence I(pi; z|x) = 0; whereas if I(pi; z|x) > 0,
then it must be that the environment can “spy” on the agent’s private policy.
6.4 Final thoughts
We have presented an information-theoretic definition of behavioral attitudes such as friendly, indif-
ferent, and adversarial and shown how to derive optimal strategies for these attitudes. These results
can serve as a general conceptual basis for the design of specialized detection mechanisms and more
robust strategies.
Two extensions are worth pointing out. The first is the extension of the model to extensive-form
games to represent sequential interactions. This will require formulating novel backward induction
procedures involving subgame equilibria [5], perhaps similar to [32]. The second is the analysis of
state-of-the-art machine learning techniques such as deep neural networks: e.g. whether randomizing
the weights protects from adversarial examples [33, 34]; and whether friendly examples exist and can
be exploited.
Importantly, we have shown the existence of a continuous range of environments that, if not finely
discriminated by the agent, will lead to strictly suboptimal strategies, even in the friendly case.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The best response-functions are obtained by optimizing the Lagrangian
L := J − λX
(∑
x
P (x)− 1
)
− λZ
(∑
z
P (z)− 1
)
where λX and λZ are the Lagrange multipliers for the equality constraints enforcing the normalization
of P (X) and P (Z) respectively. For P (Z), we fix P (X) and equate the derivatives to zero:
∂L
∂P (z)
=
∑
x
P (x)U(x, z)− 1
β
(
log
P (z)
Q(z)
+ 1
)
+ λZ
!
= 0.
Solving for P (z) yields
P (z) = Q(z) exp
{
β
∑
x
P (x)U(x, z) + βλZ − 1
}
(11)
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Since
∑
z P (z) = 1, it must be that the Lagrange multiplier λZ is equal to
λZ = − 1
β
log
∑
z
Q(z) exp
{
β
∑
z
P (x)U(x, z)− 1
}
,
which, when substituted back into (11) gives the best-response function of the claim. The argument
for P (X) proceeds analogously. 
Proof of Proposition 2. The combined best-response function is a continuous map from a compact
set into itself. It follows therefore from Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem that it has a fixed-point. 
Proof of Proposition 3. We first multiply (1) by α and then see that, for any fixed P (Z), the agent’s
best response P (X) is also the maximizer (that is, irrespective of the sign of α) of the objective
function ∑
x
P (x)
{
α
∑
z
P (z)U(x, z)− log P (x)
Q(x)
}
=
∑
x
P (x)JX(x) (12)
which ignores the terms that do not depend on P (X). JX is a continuous and monotonically
decreasing function in P (x). Assume by contradiction that there are actions x1, x2 such that
JX(x1) < JX(x2). Then one can always improve the objective function by transferring a sufficiently
small amount of probability mass from action x1 to action x2. However, this contradicts the
assumption that P (X) is a best-response and thus, JX(x1) = JX(x2). The argument for JZ
proceeds analogously. 
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